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I. INTRODUCTION 
We investigate the association between political uncertainty and accounting conservatism by 
exploiting the exogenous variation in political uncertainty induced by the U.S. presidential 
election cycle. The partisan view of politics argues that Republicans and Democrats differ with 
respect to economic, regulatory, and social policies, e.g., taxation rules, government 
expenditures, and welfare reforms (Alesina 1987). Therefore, elections bring about potential 
change in the status quo leading to an increase in uncertainty about future policy outcomes. For 
example, during the 2012 U.S. presidential election, Republican candidate, Mitt Romney, was 
quoted as saying that, if elected, he would repeal the two major reforms introduced under the 
Obama administration: the Dodd-Frank Act and the universal health care reforms. Referring to 
the health care reforms, he vowed: "What the Court did not do on its last day in session, I will do 
on my first day if elected President of the United States, and that is I will act to repeal 
Obamacare." 1  
Accounting conservatism is defined as the asymmetric verifiability of accounting gains 
versus losses, i.e., the verifiability threshold for gains is greater than that for losses (e.g., Basu 
1997; Watts 2003a, 2003b). To develop a political uncertainty hypothesis, we argue that in an 
election year, uncertainty about the election outcome and consequent changes in public policy 
can have an effect on conservatism for several reasons.2 First, changes in policy might impact on 
the profitability of assets that are already in place – a direct impact on the expected cash flows of 
a company. For example, legislative and regulatory changes can alter compliance costs, while 
changes in government expenditures and taxation rules might increase the uncertainty of firms’ 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., news reports by Washington Post - Wonkblog, Khimm (2012), and ABC News Blogs, Friedman (2012).  
2
 Another explanation for the effect of elections on accounting choices is based on political cost hypothesis (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1978, 1986), i.e., manipulating accounting numbers to reduce costs related to adverse political 
scrutiny, especially during the election period (Ramanna and Roychowdhury 2010). We cannot rule out this 
alternative explanation, but indeed find evidence to support both political uncertainty and political cost hypotheses.  
4 
 
accounting performance. Moreover, the discount rate can also be affected by uncertainty about 
future government policies (Brogaard and Detzel 2012). As a consequence, an increase in 
political uncertainty implies an increase in the verifiability threshold for profits relative to losses, 
that is, an increase in conservatism.3 The increase in uncertainty about future cash flows for a 
firm’s assets in place, ceteris paribus, also means that “shirking” is harder to detect leading to a 
rise in agency costs, and increased demand for conservatism.4 
Further, policy changes can also influence the investment opportunity set of a company. Julio 
and Yook (2012) find that rising political uncertainty leads to a reduction in corporate investment 
before elections – firms defer investments until political uncertainty is resolved. Under the 
standard assumption that the investment, if the firm had undertaken it, does not increase the 
firm’s investment opportunity set, a company should have more growth options because of 
deferred investment in an election year.5 Since growth options are positively related to agency 
costs (Smith and Watts, 1992), and conservatism is an efficient corporate governance response to 
agency costs (see Watts, 2003a), we expect an increase in conservatism in the year leading up to 
an election. Finally, political uncertainty might be positively associated with the cash holdings of 
a company. In addition to showing a reduction in investment, Julio and Yook (2012) find an 
increase of cash holdings in the pre-election period, which can raise agency costs, because the 
amount of “free” cash available increases for managers to pursue their personal interests (Jensen 
                                                 
3
 The verifiability threshold for bad news might also increase. However, since investors are more concerned about 
the downside risk, the demand for conservatism will increase with uncertainty (Watts 2003a).  
4
 More formally, in standard models of outside financing with agency cost, the proportional difference between the 
probabilities of success if a manager ‘works’ and if the manager ‘shirks’ (known as the information ratio) is a key 
determinant of the size of agency costs. The larger the difference, the easier it is to detect shirking and the less likely 
the manager will shirk (Tirole 2001). All else equal, when political uncertainty lowers the probability of success if a 
manager works, then it will be more difficult to detect shirking (a fall in the information ratio) – leading to an 
increase in agency costs. 
5
 The classic papers analysing real options and investment (e.g., McDonald and Siegel 1986; Ingersoll and Ross 
1992) assume that the investment does not increase the firm’s investment opportunities. 
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1986). As argued previously, increasing agency costs in turn leads to an increase in accounting 
conservatism.  
The empirical analysis is based on U.S. companies from Compustat for the period of 1971-
2011, which covers 11 presidential elections from 1971 to 2012. We examine the association 
between political uncertainty and accounting conservatism using Kahn and Watts' (2009) 
conservatism measure, C-Score. A consistent picture emerges: accounting conservatism 
increases in the year prior to the election date. The point estimates imply that in the year leading 
up to an election, accounting conservatism increases by 17 to 19 percent (depending on 
specifications). The results are robust to different empirical specifications and estimation 
techniques. We also perform sensitivity tests, e.g., controlling for the business cycle, political 
connections, and audit quality, conducting the analysis in pre- and post-SOX periods, and using 
alternative pre-election windows. The results remain unchanged.  
Further, we find that the effect of political uncertainty on conservatism is stronger when an 
election is more competitive. This result is intuitively appealing as a closer election is associated 
with greater uncertainty about the eventual electoral outcome. Specifically, a decrease in the 
margin for victory by 10 percent increases the overall impact of political uncertainty on 
conservatism by 25 to 59 percent. We also find that the impact of political uncertainty becomes 
greater when the incumbent president is not seeking a re-election and when the incumbent party 
is Democrat.6 In the post-election year, conservatism remains higher relative to the non-election 
period, but lower relative to the election year. Further tests indicate that this post-election effect 
is driven by opposition party victories, i.e., after the election, conservatism is actually lower 
compared to the non-election period when the incumbent party wins. This suggests that under an 
                                                 
6
 When an incumbent president is not seeking re-election, the likelihood of party turnover tends to be higher leading 
to higher political uncertainty (Gelman and King 1990). A continuation of Democrat regime might be regarded as 
bad news by the markets (Santa-Clara and Valkanov 2003), and results in high conservatism.  
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opposition party victory, political uncertainty is higher than under an incumbent party victory, 
most likely since the policy stance of incumbent party is more predictable.7 Collectively, these 
results are consistent with the political uncertainty hypothesis. 
Political uncertainty will impact on firms differently depending on factors that are associated 
with the political process and accounting conservatism, e.g., the firm's exposures to politics, 
government spending, contracting environment, litigation risk, taxation, and regulation.8 
Accordingly, we investigate cross-sectionally how these industry and firm level factors can 
exacerbate or moderate the positive relation between political uncertainty and conservatism. 
Across industries, we find that the election year effect on conservatism is stronger for politically 
sensitive industries, heavily regulated industries, and industries that are sensitive to contract 
enforcement, while conservatism tends to be weaker for labor intensive industries and industries 
with higher international trade exposure. At the firm level, we show that the increase of 
conservatism in election year is larger for firms with better external governance (lower G-index) 
mechanisms but smaller for firms with better internal governance (higher ratio of independent 
directors), and higher litigation risk. 
This paper contributes to three streams of literature. First, it contributes to the literature on 
accounting conservatism.9 Watts' (2003a) regulatory explanation argues that conservatism can 
be driven by the political process in which losses from overstated accounting numbers are more 
observable and usable for regulatory oversight. In this study, we explore the nature of 
conservatism in a particular political process, i.e., the U.S. presidential election, using a firm-
year conservatism measure, C-Sore, developed by Khan and Watts (2009). More importantly, 
                                                 
7
 Please refer to Figure 1 for an illustration of conservatism cycles around the presidential election.  
8
 Watts (2003a) provides four explanations for conservatism, i.e., contracting, litigation, taxation, and regulation. 
9
 For a review, please see Watts (2003a, 2003b). Recent studies on conservatism include Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005), Ahmed and Duellman (2007), LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008), and LaFond and Watts (2008).  
7 
 
beyond the scrutiny role of the political process (political cost hypothesis), we document another 
channel associated with political uncertainty, through which the political process can also 
influence accounting conservatism.10 Second, it also contributes to the literature on the impact of 
election cycles on economic outcomes, which argues that politicians have incentives to induce 
favorable macroeconomic outcomes before elections (e.g., McRae 1977; Nordhaus 1975; Rogoff 
and Sibert 1988). We add to this line of literature, and show that the election cycle plays an 
important role not only at the macro-level, but also at the microeconomic level, i.e., accounting 
numbers manipulated by managers at company level.  
Third, the paper contributes to an emerging literature on the role of politics in determining 
corporate performance and corporate policy. Several asset pricing studies examine the impact of 
political uncertainty on stock returns (e.g., Belo et al. 2012; Boutchkova et al. 2012; Brogaard 
and Detzel 2012). For example, Belo et al. (2012) show that highly government-exposed 
companies experience higher stock returns during Democratic presidencies. In a recent corporate 
finance study, Julio and Yook (2012) find a decline in corporate investment corresponding with 
the timing of national elections around the world.  
From the perspective of accounting practices, Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010) focus on 
a sample of 563 firms that are politically connected with U.S. congressional candidates, and find 
that in the election year of 2004, when a firm has more outsourcing activities, it tends to report 
lower discretionary accruals to avoid political oversight (an example of political cost), because 
outsourcing was a major campaign issue in 2004.11 This paper differs from their work and 
complements the literature by showing how political forces in general (not only for the 
                                                 
10
 We find strong evidence for the uncertainty explanation, e.g., the election effect is stronger for closer elections, 
but also evidence that may be consistent with both explanations, e.g., the effect is stronger for regulated industries.  
11
 Other studies, examining the political role in accounting practices, include Ramanna (2008), Guay (2010), Chaney 
et al. (2011), Kido et al. (2012), and Lent (2012).  
8 
 
outsourcing issue) affect another dimension of financial accounting choices, accounting 
conservatism,12 for a large sample of firms in a period related to 11 elections.13 More 
importantly, from a theoretical view, in addition to the political cost channel, we find that 
accounting conservatism can be influenced through another undocumented channel related to 
political uncertainty. Lastly, the dynamics of accounting conservatism around elections shed 
some light on several unanswered questions arising from Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010): 
whether their election results related to discretionary accruals in 2004 can be generalized to other 
aspects of accounting choices, and to other election years; and whether there is a time-series or 
cross-sectional variation in this political impact depending on the nature of elections, industries 
and companies.  
There is a growing interest in the impact of politics on firm performance and management 
decisions, since politics and public policy play central roles in determining the external 
boundaries in which a firm operates. In this paper, we document a new stylized fact – the 
tendency for firms to become more conservative with their accounting choices in the U.S. 
presidential election years. The paper improves our knowledge on how political forces can shape 
the nature of financial reporting. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
discusses data sources and empirical design. Section III presents results of main and 
supplemental analyses. Section IV concludes. 
 
II. DATA AND EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
Our full sample includes 147,894 firm-year observations of all the U.S. public firms from 
Compustat - Fundamentals Annual Database and CRSP Monthly Stock Database for fiscal years 
                                                 
12
 Ball and Shivakumar (2006), and Goh and Li (2011) argue that lower discretionary accruals are not necessarily 
associated with higher conservatism.  
13
 Our sample covers both politically connected and non-connected firms.  
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1971-2011.14 We construct firm-year estimates of accounting conservatism, C-Score, developed 
by Khan and Watts (2009), which allows us to capture both cross-sectional and time-series 
variation of asymmetric earnings timeliness. Khan and Watts (2009) develop their firm-year 
measure of conservatism based on Basu’s (1997) cross-sectional model:  
 
 Xi = β1 + β2Di + β3Ri + β4DiRi + εi       (1)  
 
where X is earnings, R is returns, and D is denoted as one when R<0 (bad news), and zero 
otherwise. The incremental timeliness for bad news over good news is represented by β4, while 
the timeliness measure for good news is β3. They further define G-Score (timeliness of good 
news) and C-Score (incremental timeliness of bad news) as functions of firm size, market-to-
book ratio and leverage:  
 
 G-Score = β3 = µ1 + µ2Sizei + µ3M/Bi + µ4Levi     (2) 
 C-Score = β4 = λ1 + λ2Sizei + λ3M/Bi + λ4Levi     (3) 
 
Substituting G-Score and C-Score into equation (1), an annual cross-sectional regression 
model is derived to estimate the parameters (µ1-µ4 and λ1- λ4) in equations (2) and (3). Then, the 
estimated parameters (λ1- λ4) can be used to calculate the C-Score in equation (3).  
 
Xi = β1 + β2Di + Ri(µ1 + µ2Sizei + µ3M/Bi + µ4Levi) + DiRi(λ1 + λ2Sizei + λ3M/Bi + λ4Levi) 
+(δ1Sizei + δ2M/Bi + δ3Levi + δ4DiSizei + δ5DiM/Bi + δ6DiLevi) + εi   (4) 
 
Election timing in the U.S. is determined by law. Since 1845, Election Day occurs on the first 
Tuesday after November 1. We use the U.S. presidential election cycle as an exogenous shock to 
political uncertainty to investigate its impact on accounting conservatism. Presidential elections 
follow a four year cycle on even numbered years. The sample period is associated with 11 
                                                 
14
 We extract year-end earnings announcement dates from Compustat - Fundamentals Quarterly Database, which 
limits our sample period to start from 1971. Based on the differences between announcement dates and election 
dates, we define the pre-election and post-election dummy variables used in the analysis.  
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presidential elections from 1971 to 2012.15 Let the election date be day t = 0, we construct a 
PRE-ELECTION dummy which equals one if a firm's annual earnings announcement date falls 
in the window [-360, 0), and zero otherwise.16 The baseline regression takes the form: 
 
 C-SCORE = α + γ1PRE-ELECTION + γxX + Industry/Firm Fixed Effects + ε (5) 
 
where α is the intercept and X is a vector of control variables. The coefficient of PRE-
ELECTION, γ1, captures the change in accounting conservatism in the period leading up to a 
presidential election and is expected to be positive and significant according to the political 
uncertainty hypothesis. The control variables include: 1) SIZE, natural log of the market value of 
equity; 2) MARKET/BOOK, market-to-book ratio; 3) LEVERAGE, long-term and short-term debt 
deflated by market value of equity; 4) VOLATILITY, standard deviation of daily firm-level 
returns; 5) NOACC, non-operating accruals scaled by lagged assets; 6) CFOA, cash flow from 
operations deflated by lagged assets; 7) INVEST CYCLE, a decreasing measure of the length of 
the investment cycle; 8) BID-ASK, bid-ask spread scaled by the midpoint of spread; and 9) AGE, 
firm age in years (Khan and Watts 2009). 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the variables for the full sample as well as the 
following sub-samples: 1) election year; 2) post-election year; and 3) non-election period. We 
find that conservatism as measured by C-Score is higher in election years (mean C-Score is 
0.144) than in post-election years and non-election periods (mean C-Scores are 0.131, and 0.117, 
respectively). This suggests that compared to non-election period, on average, conservatism is 23 
percent higher in the year prior to an election, and remains 12 percent higher in the year 
following the election in a univariate analysis.17 In the next section, we perform multivariate 
                                                 
15
 Please refer to the U.S. Election Statistics: A Resource Guide from the Library of Congress.  
16
 We find results robust, when using different pre-election windows, e.g., 90 or 180 days.  
17
 An increase by 23 percent is equal to (0.144-0.117)/0.117, and 12 percent is equal to (0.131-0.117)/0.117.  
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regressions to examine whether the election-year effect holds after controlling for other factors 
that can influence accounting conservatism.  
 
II. RESULTS 
Elections and Conservatism  
We present the results of our baseline model in Table 2. Consistent with our expectations, the 
coefficient estimate on PRE-ELECTION is positive and significant at the one percent level 
across all specifications. The result is robust to the inclusion of control variables, industry fixed 
effects as well as firm fixed effects. Conservatism increases in the year prior to elections, with 
coefficients ranging from 0.0214 (Model 3) to 0.0245 (Model 4). Given an unconditional mean 
C-Score equal to 0.127 in Table 1, these estimates translate to an increase in conservatism by 17-
19 percent. In Model 6, we include control variables and firm fixed effects and find that with-in a 
firm, MARKET/BOOK is negatively correlated with conservatism while LEVERAGE, CFOA, 
INVEST CYCLE, VOLATILITY and AGE are positively correlated with conservatism.  
To further test the political uncertainty hypothesis, we study whether the degree of electoral 
competition exacerbates the election year effect in conservatism. Closer elections entail more 
uncertainty about the eventual winner and therefore are associated with higher political 
uncertainty. We construct a variable called MARGIN to measure the degree of political 
competition as follows: Let c be the total number of electoral colleges, let w be the number of 
votes cast for the winning candidate, and let l be the number of votes cast for the losing 
candidate, then the MARGIN is denoted as:  
 
 MARGIN = (w – l) / c         (6) 
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The coefficient of interest is related to the interaction term between PRE-ELECTION and 
MARGIN (PRE x MARGIN). We expect that strong political competition (small MARGIN) is 
associated with high political uncertainty and therefore greater conservatism. Table 3 presents 
the results from this analysis. As expected, the coefficient on PRE x MARGIN is negative and 
significant at the one percent level in all specifications. The coefficient estimates for the PRE x 
MARGIN range from -0.0594 (Model 6) to -0.145 (Model 4) implying that a 10 percent decrease 
in MARGIN results in an increase in the election effect by 25 to 59 percent.18 
Incumbency Advantage and Party Affiliation 
In this sub-section, we investigate whether: 1) the incumbency advantage; and 2) the party 
affiliation of the incumbent president exacerbate the election year impact on conservatism. Prior 
studies document the incumbency advantage phenomenon: ceteris paribus, incumbents have an 
advantage at the polls (e.g., Gelman and King 1990). Accordingly, we expect elections in which 
the incumbent president is running for re-election to be less competitive, and thereby lower 
political uncertainty. We capture exogenous variation in incumbency advantage using an 
indicator variable, INCUM, equal to one if the incumbent president is seeking re-election,19 and 
expect the coefficient on the interaction term between INCUMB and PRE-ELECTION to be 
negative. Table 4 presents the results. We find a negative and significant coefficient on PRE x 
INCUM, implying the conservatism in an election is reduced if the incumbent president is 
seeking re-election, which is consistent with the political uncertainty hypothesis.  
Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) show that excess stock market returns are higher under 
Democratic than Republican presidencies after controlling for business-cycles and stock 
                                                 
18
 An increase by 25 percent is equal to (0.0594 x 0.1)/0.0240, and 59 percent is equal to (0.145 x 0.1)/0.0214. The 
benchmarks of election effect, 0.0240, and 0.0214, are estimates of PRE-ELECTION in Table 2 for same models.  
19
 Legislation in the U.S. allows a president to serve a maximum of two consecutive terms, meaning an incumbent 
president can run for re-election only once. Therefore, to a large extent, INCUM is exogenously determined by law - 
during our sample period, after their first presidential term, all the incumbent presidents seek re-election.  
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riskiness. Belo et al. (2012) further show that during Democratic presidencies, firms with high 
government exposure experience higher cash flows and stock returns. They also show that the 
reverse is true for Republican presidencies. To this end, we investigate whether incumbent party 
affiliation alters the pattern of conservatism around elections. We define an indicator variable, 
DEM, equal to one if the incumbent president is a Democrat and zero otherwise. The coefficient 
of interest is the interaction between DEM and PRE-ELECTION (PRE x DEM). We have no 
strong prediction for the coefficient on PRE x DEM, although we may expect the coefficient to 
be positive, because a victory by the Democratic party is regarded as bad news around the 
announcement date of election outcome (Santa-Clara and Valkanov 2003), which might make 
managers more conservative in the election year. In Table 4, after controlling for the effect of 
incumbency advantage (Models 7 – 9), we find that the coefficients on DEM are negative, and 
the coefficients on PRE x DEM are positive (both significant at one percent level). That is, prior 
to an election, managers are more conservative with financial reporting when a Democratic 
regime is very likely to be continued,20 however, during a long-term Democratic mandate, 
companies tend to have lower accounting conservatism. These results are consistent with 
findings in Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) who show a negative market reaction to the 
announcement of a Democratic victory but higher stock returns under a Democratic regime.  
Post-election Conservatism 
Our primary focus up to this point has been to study whether firms become more 
conservative with their financial reporting leading up to an election. A natural question to ask is 
whether conservatism decreases when political uncertainty falls after the election. We construct a 
variable, POST-ELECTION, equal to one if firms’ annual earnings announcement date falls in 
                                                 
20
 An incumbent party is highly likely to continue its administration. For example, for 29 elections from 1900 to 
2012, the continuation rate of a political regime is 61 percent for Democrats and 62 percent for Republicans.  
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the window (0, +360] and zero otherwise. Panel A of Table 5 shows positive and significant 
estimates for POST-ELECTION consistently across specifications, implying that conservatism 
remains high in the year after elections relative to non-election periods. Focusing on the most 
restrictive model (Model 6) the coefficient estimates for PRE-ELECTION and POST-
ELECTION are 0.0285 and 0.0137, respectively. Compared to the unconditional mean value for 
conservatism, these estimates imply that conservatism increases by about 22 percent in the year 
leading up to an election, and remains about 11 percent higher than all other years in the year 
following an election.21 These results suggest that while the end of an election may signal no 
more uncertainty about who forms office, the period immediately after an election may still be 
associated with higher than average political uncertainty. 
The persistence of high conservatism after the election date might simply be driven by a 
change in political party as a result of the election. One might expect that the policy stance of the 
incumbent party is more predictable, relative to that of the opposition party, given that they have 
been in office for at least one term. Therefore, consistent with the political uncertainty 
hypothesis, an election that results in the opposition party forming office is associated with 
continued policy uncertainty relative to an election where the incumbent party retains power – 
leading to higher than average conservatism post-election. We investigate this possibility by 
creating an indicator variable, OPPWIN, equal to one if the opposition party wins the election, 
and interacting it with POST-ELECTION. We expect the coefficient of interest on POST x 
OPPWIN to be positive. In Panel B of Table 5, we find that the estimates on POST x OPPWIN 
are significantly positive, and after controlling for OPPWIN the coefficients on POST-
ELECTION become negative and significant at one percent, which is consistent with the notion 
                                                 
21
 Please note that these estimates are very close to those obtained from the univariate comparison of C-Score across 
election and non-election years in the previous section. 
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that the election year effect on conservatism is reversed if the incumbent party retains power, but 
persists at a high level when the election is won by the opposition party. In Model 6, the 
estimates for PRE-ELECTION and POST-ELECTION are 0.0288 and -0.00575 respectively, 
implying an increase in conservatism by approximately 23 percent in the year leading up to an 
election, and a reduction in conservatism of approximately five percent in the year following 
when the incumbent party retains power (relative to the unconditional mean C-Score of 0.127 in 
Table 1). Figure 1 illustrates the cycles in conservatism using the estimates from Model 6 of 
Table 5. The dashed line displays conservatism before and after a presidential election regardless 
of the electoral outcome (Model 6 of Panel A). The solid line represents the cycles in 
conservatism around elections that are won by the incumbent party (Model 6 of Panel B). A 
significant decline in conservatism is observed in the post-election year, however, the magnitude 
of the post-election decline is smaller than that of the initial increase – roughly one-fifth the size 
of pre-election increase.22, 23 
 
[Figure 1 is inserted here] 
 
 
Industry Characteristics and Conservatism Cycles 
Watts (2003a) argues that conservatism exists for four reasons: 1) to mitigate contracting 
problems (including debt and compensation contracts); 2) to reduce litigation risks; 3) to avoid 
regulatory costs; and 4) to minimise taxation obligations. Political uncertainty may affect 
accounting conservatism differently depending on firms’ exposures to politics, government 
spending, contracting environment, litigation risk, taxation, and regulation. In this and the next 
sub-sections, we explore how the cross-sectional variation in political uncertainty across 
industries and firms affects the election year increase in conservatism. We first focus on industry 
                                                 
22
 The relative magnitude of the post-election decline in conservatism is calculated as (0.00575/0.0288)=0.20. 
23
 In Panel C, PRE-MARGIN is added into the specification. All the previous results remain qualitatively similar.  
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characterises including political sensitivity, regulatory oversight, contract enforcement, labor 
intensity, and international trade exposure. The results from industry cross-sectional analyses are 
presented in Table 6. 
Political sensitivity and regulatory oversight 
We perform tests on two industry factors, i.e., political sensitivity, and regulatory oversight, 
and expect the election effect to be stronger for more sensitive and regulated industries. 
Following Julio and Yook (2012), we categorise the following industries as sensitive sectors: 
tobacco products, pharmaceuticals, health care services, defence, petroleum and natural gas, 
telecommunications, transportation, and finance. We create a variable, SENSITIVE, equal to one 
if a firm belongs to a sensitive industry. From the regulatory oversight perspective, we construct 
another indicator variable, REGULATE, equal to one if a firm operates in the finance or utilities 
industries. The results presented in Models 1 to 4 confirm our conjecture. In particular, estimates 
on PRE x SENSITIVE and PRE x REGULATE are both positive and significant, suggesting two 
possibilities: in these two groups of industries, 1) there is a greater potential for policy change 
(political uncertainty hypothesis); or 2) costs related to political scrutiny are higher (political 
cost hypothesis).  
Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010) document a decline in discretionary accruals for 
companies connected with U.S. congressional candidates in the election year of 2004, especially 
for outsourcing-intensive firms, based on a political cost hypothesis. While we cannot rule out 
the possibility that the political cost hypothesis may also explain some of our election year effect, 
given our previous evidence in support of the political uncertainty hypothesis,24 the findings here 
suggest that the two hypotheses may jointly explain the phenomenon of conservatism cycles.  
                                                 
24
 It is difficult to explain the results in the tests for electoral competition, incumbency advantage and post-election 
conservatism with the political cost hypothesis.  
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Contract enforcement, labor intensity, and international trade exposure 
Following Boutchkova et al. (2012), we examine three additional industry characteristics, 
namely, contract enforcement, labor intensity, and international trade exposure and report the 
results in Models 5 to 10. Since the protection of property rights and contract enforcement 
depend on the quality of institutions, which are in turn affected by political forces, complex 
industries with high sensitivity to contract enforcement (also with a high demand for institutional 
quality) are expected to be more conservative with financial reporting in election years, when 
political uncertainty leads to uncertainty in future institutional quality. Boutchkova et al. (2012) 
use US Input-Output tables from 1998 to 2006 to calculate the Blanchard and Kremer (1997) 
measure of contract enforcement sensitivity for 50 U.S. industries at the two-digit SIC code 
level.25 This measure is equal to one minus the Herfindahl index of industry input shares, and 
varies from zero (if the industry uses inputs from only one industry) to one. To study the impact 
of contracting environment, we construct a variable, HIGH-CONTRACT, equal to one if a firm 
belongs to an industry with an above median sensitivity to contract enforcement according to the 
Boutchkova et al. (2012) measure. In Models 5 and 6, we find that the coefficients on PRE x 
HIGH-CONTRACT are positive and significant, implying that companies, which rely more on 
contract enforcement and institutional quality, tend to be more conservative, when there is an 
increase in political uncertainty and potential changes in institutional quality.  
The labor intensity factor studied in Boutchkova et al. (2012) may be a rough indicator for 
low-technology industries, which are less beholden to the changes in government policies, and 
rely less on government funding for research and development purpose compared to high-
technology industries (e.g., information technology and medical industries). Consequently, we 
might expect the election year effect to be smaller in the low-technology industries. For firms 
                                                 
25
 The estimates for sensitivity to contract enforcement are presented in column 7 of Table 2 in their paper.  
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with high exposure to international trade, revenues are less influenced by domestic politics, 
therefore a smaller election year effect is also predicted. The labor intensity measure in 
Boutchkova et al. (2012) is estimated as the value of labor inputs to the total value of production 
inputs using data from 1990 to 2005 for 32 sectors.26 International trade exposure is the 
proportion of export flows for each industry to a particular trading partner, and then is summed 
across all trading partners, available for 29 industries.27 We construct two dummy variables: 
HIGH-LABOR and HIGH-TRADE that are equal to one if a firm belongs to an industry with an 
above median value for labor intensity or international exposure according to Boutchkova et al. 
(2012). From Models 7 to 10, consistent with the predictions, we find smaller election-year 
effects in low-technology industries and in industries with higher international trade exposure 
(negative coefficients on PRE x HIGH-LABOR and PRE x HIGH-TRADE). 
Firm Characteristics and Conservatism Cycles 
In this sub-section, we examine the roles of corporate governance, tax avoidance and 
litigation risk in explaining the association between political uncertainty and accounting 
conservatism.  
Corporate governance 
Whether “good” governance has a moderating or exacerbating effect is unclear. As 
discussed, political uncertainty is positively associated with agency costs and thus demand for 
conservatism due to three reasons, i.e., greater difficulty detecting managers' shirking behavior 
(Tirole 2001), more growth options, and increased amount of the cash available to manager 
(Julio and Yook 2012). We may expect governance to have a negative (positive) influence on the 
                                                 
26
 The data are obtained from the input–output database using information from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
and Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
27
 The estimates for labor intensity and trade exposure are presented in columns 7 and 6 of Table 2 in their paper.  
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election year effect if it is a substitute (complement) to conservatism in solving agency problems. 
An exogenous shock to agency costs from the presidential election provides us an opportunity to 
explore these two possibilities.  
We extract the corporate governance information from RiskMetrics - Directors and 
Governance Databases, and employ two governance proxies in this analysis: 1) the external 
governance index developed by Gompers et al. (2003) (G-INDEX) which is the anti-takeover 
provision index for the market for corporate control, and 2) the percentage of independent 
directors on the board, INDEPENDENT, as a measure of internal governance associated with the 
monitoring roles of investors and board of directors.28 In Models 1 to 3 of Table 7, we find 
negative coefficients on PRE x G-INDEX and PRE x INDEPENDENT, which implies that 
external (internal) governance might be a complement (substitute) to accounting conservatism in 
mitigating the increased agency costs caused by rising political uncertainty. These results are also 
insightful for the literature on the relation between governance and conservatism for two reasons. 
First, we show that the relation between governance and conservatism may be different for 
internal versus external measures of governance. Second, previous studies such as Ahmed and 
Duellman (2007) and García Lara et al. (2009) who find a positive association between 
governance and conservatism take agency costs as given, while we provide a new piece of 
evidence on the governance-conservatism relation in a setting where there is an exogenous 
increase in agency costs due to the election cycle.  
Tax and litigation 
Finally, we consider the roles of tax avoidance and litigation risk. TAX is estimated as the 
effective tax rate under GAAP, an inverse measure of tax avoidance, equal to total tax expense 
                                                 
28
 A lower level of the G-index implies better external governance, while higher percentage of independent directors 
reflects stronger internal governance. The sample size is reduced by about 90 percent because RiskMetrics data are 
not available for earlier years and for small firms.  
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divided by pre-tax accounting income less special items. A higher value of TAX implies a lower 
incidence of tax avoidance (McGuire et al. 2012). We estimate the measure of probability of 
litigation, LITIGATION, an inverse logit of a linear combination of firm fundamentals (Shu 
2000).29 The results for TAX and LITIGATION are presented in Models 4 to 9. Focusing on 
Models 6 and 9 that control for firm fixed effects, we find that the coefficients are negative for 
the interaction terms, PRE x TAX and PRE x LITIGATION, but only significant for the latter. 
This indicates that the election year effect on conservatism is lessened for firms with higher 
litigation risk, which may represent the fact that managers of these firms are on average more 
conservative and accordingly do not respond as much to rising political uncertainty in the lead up 
to elections.  
Robustness 
There may be alternative explanations for our findings, and we take them into consideration 
by conducting several sensitivity tests in this section.  
Political connections 
Prior studies show that the political connectedness of a firm has implications for its behavior 
and performance due to preferential treatment, and that politicians can also potentially benefit 
from these connections. For example, using a sample of international firms, Chaney et al. (2011) 
find that the quality of earnings reported by politically connected firms is significantly poorer 
than that of similar non-connected companies. Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010) document 
that politically connected companies report low discretionary accruals when their outsourcing 
                                                 
29
 Specifically, this combination equal to {-10.049 + 0.276 (Size) + 1.153 (Inventory) + 2.075 (Receivables) + 1.251 
(ROA) - 0.088 (Current ratio) + 1.501 (Lev) + 0.301 (Sales growth) - 0.371 (stock return) - 2.309 (stock volatility) + 
0.235 (beta) + 1.464 (stock turnover) + 1.060 (Delist dummy) + 0.928 (Technology dummy) + 0.463 (Qualified 
opinion dummy)}. Please refer to Table 3 of Shu (2000) for more details.  
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activities are a major concern during the campaign.30 Taking the Watts (2003a, 2003b) view that 
conservatism is a value enhancing mechanism to reduce agency costs, one may argue that the our 
conservatism results are largely driven by politically connected firms trying to help affiliated 
politicians win office. To address this issue, we include a dummy, CONNECTED, equal to one if 
a firm is politically connected based on the data in Faccio (2006) and re-run the analysis. In 
Models 1 and 2 of Table 8, we find that our results remain the same, and the interaction term, 
PRE x CONNECTED, has an insignificant coefficient.  
The political business cycle 
Conceptually, it is possible for the incumbent party to manipulate fiscal and monetary policy 
instruments to improve macroeconomic outcomes prior to an election in order to maximize the 
probability of re-election (e.g., McRae 1977; Nordhaus 1975; Rogoff and Sibert 1988).31 A 
rational firm may respond to this political business cycle by changing it accounting choices. If a 
policy change is favorable to the company, presumably managers may become less conservative, 
however when managers are aware of the transitory nature of favorable policy, they may even 
report earnings in a more conservative manner. To investigate this possibility, we introduce two 
macroeconomic indicators: economic growth, GROWTH, and inflation, INFLATION, proxied by 
growth in real gross domestic product (GDP), and growth in the consumer price index (CPI), 
respectively. In Models 3-5 of Table 8, results are robust to the inclusion of business cycle 
variables and their interactions with PRE-ELECTION.  
 
                                                 
30
 See other studies related to political connections, for example, include Johnson and Mitton (2003), Faccio (2006), 
and Faccio et al. (2006). 
31
 Empirical evidence in the U.S. to support this view is limited (Drazen 2000), while studies in emerging markets 
show some evidence that governments take actions to improve chances of re-election (Brown and Dinc 2005; Dinc 
2005).  
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Auditor Quality 
One may argue that the election effects might be driven by auditor quality. For example, 
firms may choose Big 4 auditors coincidentally in election years, and due to higher audit quality 
financial reports tend to be more conservative. To rule out this possibility, we add a dummy 
variable, BIG 4, into our analysis, which is equal to one if a firm is audited by a Big-4 CPA firm. 
The results presented in Models 6 to 8 show that our election effects remain robust to the 
inclusion of BIG 4 and PRE x BIG 4.  
Pre- versus post-SOX  
After the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), the impact of political process on 
conservatism can be stronger for two reasons. First, in the post-SOX period there has been 
increased public attention on accounting issues, firms may therefore react more to political 
uncertainty because of an increase in demand for conservatism from investors and politicians. 
Second, in the post-SOX period, the likelihood of a change in accounting standards due to a 
switch in political regime may be deemed as higher, therefore creating “accounting slack” in the 
form of conservatism might be desirable. For example, in a campaign event leading up to the 
2012 election, when asked by a voter, Mr. Romney pledged to repeal the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.32  
We analyze the impact of SOX in two ways: 1) perform the analysis in two sample periods 
split by SOX; and 2) introduce an indicator variable, SOX, for the post-SOX period into the 
baseline model. The results presented in Table 9 show that the election year effects are robust in 
two sub-periods, and remain unchanged after the SOX dummy is included. In Models 7 to 9, we 
also find that, on average in post-SOX period, conservatism is higher (positive coefficient on 
SOX) and the election year effects are stronger (positive coefficient on PRE x SOX), which is 
consistent with our conjecture.  
                                                 
32
 See, for example, a news report by Wall Street Journal Blogs, Murray (2012).  
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Alternative pre-election windows 
There may be concern that our results are an artefact of our choice of pre-election window. 
Accordingly, we rerun the analysis using alternative windows of 90 days and 180 days. The 
results presented in Table 10 indicate that the findings of election effects are qualitatively the 
same.33  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We exploit exogenous variation in political uncertainty induced by the U.S. presidential 
election cycle to study its impact on accounting conservatism. An interesting picture emerges: in 
the year leading up to an election, accounting conservatism increases by nearly 20 percent. 
Further tests reveal that this electoral phenomenon is indeed caused by political uncertainty and 
is stronger when the election is closer, and when the incumbent president is not seeking re-
election. In the post-election year, conservatism is lower relative to the non-election period when 
the incumbent party wins, but remains higher under an opposition party victory. This new 
stylized fact adds to our knowledge regarding how political forces shape the nature of financial 
reporting, and contributes to a growing literature on the role of politics in determining corporate 
performance and corporate policy. One avenue for future research is to investigate the impact of 
elections, as an exogenous political shock to the flow of accounting information, on firms’ 
information environment and the behavior of the users, preparers, auditors, and disseminators of 
financial reports. 
 
  
                                                 
33
 Note that we do not include firm fixed-effects in Table 10, as a pre-election dummy cannot capture all the firms in 
a short window (less than one year) prior to the election date. 
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FIGURE 1 
Conservatism around Presidential Elections 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure displays estimates from the regression results reported in Model 6 of Table 5. OPPWIN is an indicator variable equal one if the election results in a opposition party's 
victory. The dashed line displays conservatism after presidential election regardless of the electoral outcome (Model 6 of Panel A). The solid line displays conservatism around 
presidential election when the incumbent party wins the campaign (Model 6 of Panel B). The vertical axis represents percentage change in conservatism relative to the 
unconditional mean.  
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TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
Full Sample Election Year Post-Election Year Non-Election Period 
Obs Mean  Std. Dev. Obs Mean  Std. Dev. Obs Mean  Std. Dev. Obs Mean  Std. Dev. 
C-SCORE 147,894 0.127 0.154 38,259 0.144 0.206 35,327 0.131 0.144 74,308 0.117 0.124 
SIZE 147,894 5.246 1.999 382,59 5.286 2.012 35,327 5.172 1.968 74,308 5.260 2.006 
MARKET/BOOK 147,894 2.299 2.394 38,259 2.401 2.728 35,327 2.229 2.243 74,308 2.280 2.274 
LEVERAGE 147,894 0.896 1.338 38,259 0.897 1.333 35,327 0.902 1.367 74,308 0.893 1.327 
NOACC 147,894 -0.015 0.159 38,259 -0.014 0.122 35,327 -0.017 0.204 74,308 -0.015 0.151 
CFOA 147,894 0.062 0.191 38,259 0.061 0.187 35,327 0.061 0.184 74,308 0.063 0.196 
INVEST CYCLE 147,894 0.043 0.055 38,259 0.043 0.048 35,327 0.044 0.075 74,308 0.043 0.047 
VOLATILITY 147,894 0.032 0.018 38,259 0.032 0.018 35,327 0.033 0.021 74,308 0.031 0.017 
BID-ASK 147,894 0.015 0.016 38,259 0.015 0.016 35,327 0.016 0.018 74,308 0.015 0.015 
AGE 147,894 13.282 10.160 38,259 13.375 10.205 35,327 13.061 9.976 74,308 13.339 10.223 
INDEPENDENT 22,722 0.681 0.177 5,704 0.694 0.174 5,475 0.669 0.181 11,543 0.680 0.175 
G-INDEX 21,952 9.054 2.753 5,092 8.998 2.787 5,093 9.084 2.739 11,767 9.065 2.743 
TAX 116,411 0.325 0.165 30,314 0.324 0.167 27,969 0.327 0.164 58,128 0.325 0.165 
LITIGATION 123,637 0.003 0.005 31,872 0.003 0.004 29,648 0.003 0.006 62,117 0.003 0.005 
CONNECTED 147,894 0.001 0.035 38,259 0.001 0.035 35,327 0.001 0.036 74,308 0.001 0.035 
BIG 4 131,403 0.850 0.357 33,881 0.848 0.359 30,585 0.858 0.349 66,937 0.848 0.359 
SENSITIVE 147,894 0.314 0.464 38,259 0.320 0.466 35,327 0.309 0.462 74,308 0.313 0.464 
REGULATE 147,894 0.226 0.418 38,259 0.229 0.420 35,327 0.222 0.416 74,308 0.226 0.418 
GROWTH 124,111 0.028 0.020 31,417 0.026 0.016 29,959 0.034 0.021 62,735 0.026 0.021 
INFLATION 124,111 0.038 0.026 31,417 0.039 0.025 29,959 0.042 0.026 62,735 0.036 0.026 
 
This table presents summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. C–SCORE is Kahn and Watts (2009) measure of accounting conservatism. SIZE is defined as the 
natural log of the market value of equity. MARKET/BOOK is market-to-book ratio. LEVERAGE is defined as long-term and short-term debt deflated by market value of equity. 
VOLATILITY is standard deviation of daily firm-level returns. NOACC is non-operating accruals, scaled by lagged assets. CFOA is cash flow from operations, deflated by lagged 
assets. INVEST CYCLE is a decreasing measure of the length of the investment cycle. BID-ASK is bid–ask spread, scaled by the midpoint of the spread. AGE is firm age, in 
years. INDEPENDENT is proportion of independent directors. G-INDEX is Gompers et al. (2003) index of external governance. TAX is equal to total tax expense divided by pre-
tax accounting income less special items. LITIGATION is Shu (2000) measure of the probability of litigation. CONNECTED is an indicator equal to one if the firm is politically 
connected. GROWTH is annual growth in real gross domestic product. INFLATION is annual growth in the consumer price index. BIG 4 is an indicator if a firm uses one of the 
Big-4 auditing firms. SENSISTIVE is an indicator variable equal one if firm belongs to a politically sensitive industry. REGULATE is an indicator equal one if a firm is in the 
finance or utilities industry.   
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TABLE 2 
Political Uncertainty and Conservatism 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PRE-ELECTION 0.0225*** 0.0223*** 0.0214*** 0.0245*** 0.0243*** 0.0240*** 
 (23.52) (23.40) (23.12) (27.47) (27.18) (26.87) 
SIZE    -0.0362*** -0.0367*** -0.0483*** 
    (-97.40) (-98.24) (-76.66) 
MARKET/BOOK    -0.00903*** -0.00869*** -0.00853*** 
    (-41.00) (-40.34) (-30.49) 
LEVERAGE    0.0415*** 0.0381*** 0.0419*** 
    (64.58) (53.95) (39.26) 
NOACC    -0.00946*** -0.00970*** 0.00117 
    (-4.486) (-3.229) (0.605) 
CFOA    -0.0184*** -0.0129*** 0.0104*** 
    (-4.850) (-4.890) (3.005) 
INVEST CYCLE    -0.0776*** -0.00710 0.0269*** 
    (-3.985) (-1.129) (3.046) 
VOLATILITY    1.310*** 1.406*** 0.252*** 
    (21.55) (20.57) (6.302) 
BID-ASK    -0.787*** -0.759*** 0.0164 
    (-10.57) (-10.45) (0.419) 
AGE    0.000668*** 0.00102*** 0.00467*** 
    (14.08) (20.90) (50.45) 
Constant 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.122*** 0.261*** 0.188*** 0.285*** 
 (135.1) (128.6) (508.1) (86.07) (86.64) (90.05) 
       
Observations 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 
R-squared 0.004 0.063 0.006 0.406 0.420 0.210 
Fixed-Effects None Industry Firm None Industry Firm 
 
This table presents our baseline results from the estimation of equation (5). The dependent variable is Kahn and Watts (2009) C–SCORE. Our independent variable of interest is 
PRE-ELECTION which is an indicator variable equal to one for all days in the year (360 days) prior to an election date. Our list of controls includes: (1) SIZE defined as natural 
log of the market value of equity; (2) MARKET/BOOK is market-to-book ratio; (3) LEVERAGE is sum of long-term and short-term debt deflated by market value of equity; (4) 
VOLATILITY is standard deviation of daily firm-level returns; (5) NOACC is non-operating accruals, scaled by lagged assets; (6) CFOA is cash flow from operations, deflated by 
lagged assets; (7) INVEST CYCLE is a decreasing measure of the length of the investment cycle; (8) BID-ASK is bid–ask spread, scaled by the midpoint of the spread; and (9) 
AGE is firm age, in years. Robust t-statistics are (clustered standard errors by firm) in parentheses. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by ***, **, and *. 
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TABLE 3 
Electoral Competition and Conservatism 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PRE-ELECTION 0.0621*** 0.0587*** 0.0485*** 0.0782*** 0.0742*** 0.0460*** 
 (31.60) (30.29) (26.55) (44.84) (42.59) (27.13) 
PRE x MARGIN -0.107*** -0.0989*** -0.0734*** -0.145*** -0.135*** -0.0594*** 
 (-31.60) (-30.16) (-25.48) (-52.14) (-48.93) (-24.02) 
SIZE    -0.0376*** -0.0379*** -0.0477*** 
    (-109.1) (-108.7) (-76.47) 
MARKET/BOOK    -0.00924*** -0.00893*** -0.00874*** 
    (-44.25) (-43.30) (-31.67) 
LEVERAGE    0.0413*** 0.0383*** 0.0419*** 
    (65.39) (54.99) (39.28) 
NOACC    -0.00875*** -0.00906*** 0.00131 
    (-4.339) (-3.196) (0.691) 
CFOA    -0.0178*** -0.0128*** 0.00975*** 
    (-4.969) (-4.988) (2.928) 
INVEST CYCLE    -0.0681*** -0.00705 0.0251*** 
    (-3.895) (-1.158) (2.966) 
VOLATILITY    1.087*** 1.186*** 0.216*** 
    (20.31) (19.67) (5.561) 
BID-ASK    -0.699*** -0.679*** 0.0177 
    (-10.45) (-10.35) (0.456) 
AGE    0.000630*** 0.000947*** 0.00438*** 
    (14.25) (20.62) (48.01) 
Constant 0.122*** 0.150*** 0.122*** 0.274*** 0.326*** 0.287*** 
 (135.1) (17,616) (510.9) (98.62) (124.6) (91.58) 
       
Observations 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 
R-squared 0.015 0.073 0.014 0.426 0.436 0.215 
Fixed-Effects None Industry Firm None Industry Firm 
 
This table presents results from the estimation of equation (5). The dependent variable is Kahn and Watts (2009) C–SCORE. Our independent variables of interest are: (1) PRE-
ELECTION which is an indicator variable equal to one for all days in the year (360 days) prior to an election date; and (2) PRE x MARGIN which is the interaction term between 
PRE-ELECTION and the normalize margin for victory. Our list of controls includes: (1) SIZE is natural log of the market value of equity; (2) MARKET/BOOK is market-to-book 
ratio; (3) LEVERAGE sum of long-term and short-term debt deflated by market value of equity; (4) VOLATILITY is standard deviation of daily firm-level returns; (5) NOACC is 
non-operating accruals, scaled by lagged assets; (6) CFOA is cash flow from operations, deflated by lagged assets; (7) INVEST CYCLE is a decreasing measure of the length of 
the investment cycle; (8) BID-ASK is bid–ask spread, scaled by the midpoint of the spread; and (9) AGE is firm age, in years. Robust t-statistics are (clustered standard errors by 
firm) in parentheses. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by ***, **, and *.  
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TABLE 4 
Incumbency Advantage and Party Affiliation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
PRE-ELECTION 0.0839*** 0.0798*** 0.0427*** 0.102*** 0.0985*** 0.0658*** 0.102*** 0.0979*** 0.0598*** 
 (35.68) (34.10) (18.73) (40.59) (39.39) (27.04) (36.80) (35.66) (22.29) 
PRE x MARGIN -0.150*** -0.140*** -0.0591*** -0.139*** -0.129*** -0.0553*** -0.141*** -0.131*** -0.0516*** 
 (-47.69) (-45.06) (-21.40) (-53.28) (-49.61) (-23.29) (-48.17) (-45.07) (-19.50) 
DEM -0.00576*** -0.00775*** -0.0196***    -0.00811*** -0.0101*** -0.0219*** 
 (-8.846) (-11.82) (-29.48)    (-12.25) (-15.14) (-31.84) 
PRE x DEM -0.0123*** -0.0117*** 0.00925***    0.00370*** 0.00445*** 0.0234*** 
 (-7.671) (-7.321) (5.837)    (2.696) (3.251) (16.30) 
PRE x INCUM    -0.0436*** -0.0439*** -0.0355*** -0.0441*** -0.0444*** -0.0408*** 
    (-22.85) (-23.05) (-18.69) (-24.27) (-24.47) (-22.12) 
Constant 0.275*** 0.331*** 0.294*** 0.274*** 0.325*** 0.285*** 0.276*** 0.333*** 0.293*** 
 (97.88) (124.4) (93.89) (98.97) (124.5) (91.06) (98.29) (125.2) (94.12) 
          
Observations 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 
R-squared 0.427 0.438 0.220 0.431 0.441 0.220 0.431 0.442 0.226 
Fixed-Effects None Industry Firm None Industry Firm None Industry Firm 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
This table presents our results from the estimation of equation (5). The dependent variable is Kahn and Watts (2009) C–SCORE. Our key independent variables of interest are: (1) 
PRE-ELECTION which is an indicator variable equal to one for all days in the year (360 days) prior to an election date; and (2) PRE x MARGIN which is the interaction term 
between PRE-ELECTION and the normalize margin for victory. DEM is an indicator variable equal to one if the incumbent president is a Democrat. INCUM is an indicator 
variable equal one if the incumbent president is seeking re-election. Control variables are from Table 2 but not reported. Robust t-statistics are (clustered standard errors by firm) in 
parentheses. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by ***, **, and *. 
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TABLE 5 
Post-Election Conservatism 
 
PANEL A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PRE-ELECTION 0.0271*** 0.0269*** 0.0261*** 0.0273*** 0.0270*** 0.0285*** 
 (27.28) (27.24) (27.42) (29.54) (29.26) (30.90) 
POST-ELECTION 0.0141*** 0.0141*** 0.0143*** 0.00845*** 0.00846*** 0.0137*** 
 (20.20) (20.35) (21.92) (14.61) (14.56) (24.50) 
Constant 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.258*** 0.185*** 0.282*** 
 (127.0) (119.7) (367.4) (84.94) (85.17) (89.45) 
       
Observations 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 
R-squared 0.005 0.065 0.009 0.407 0.420 0.212 
Fixed-Effects None Industry Firm None Industry Firm 
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
 
      
 
      
PANEL B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PRE-ELECTION 0.0271*** 0.0269*** 0.0261*** 0.0274*** 0.0272*** 0.0288*** 
 (27.27) (27.25) (27.42) (29.72) (29.46) (31.17) 
POST-ELECTION -0.0152*** -0.0147*** -0.0148*** -0.0137*** -0.0126*** -0.00575*** 
 (-22.48) (-22.07) (-25.59) (-26.49) (-24.11) (-12.27) 
POST x OPPWIN 0.0603*** 0.0594*** 0.0596*** 0.0463*** 0.0439*** 0.0407*** 
 (45.70) (46.13) (51.83) (45.51) (41.55) (45.09) 
Constant 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.265*** 0.189*** 0.287*** 
 (127.0) (119.7) (371.3) (88.79) (87.12) (93.88) 
       
Observations 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 
R-squared 0.015 0.074 0.023 0.412 0.425 0.218 
Fixed-Effects None Industry Firm None Industry Firm 
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
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PANEL C (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PRE-ELECTION 0.0666*** 0.0633*** 0.0537*** 0.0819*** 0.0780*** 0.0516*** 
 (33.62) (32.44) (29.32) (46.83) (44.63) (30.31) 
PRE x MARGIN -0.107*** -0.0990*** -0.0751*** -0.147*** -0.137*** -0.0620*** 
 (-31.60) (-30.18) (-26.01) (-53.12) (-50.02) (-25.04) 
POST-ELECTION -0.0152*** -0.0147*** -0.0154*** -0.0146*** -0.0135*** -0.00674*** 
 (-22.48) (-22.15) (-26.61) (-28.48) (-26.35) (-14.34) 
POST x OPPWIN 0.0603*** 0.0595*** 0.0605*** 0.0485*** 0.0463*** 0.0424*** 
 (45.70) (46.17) (52.55) (49.46) (45.76) (47.35) 
Constant 0.117*** 0.123*** 0.117*** 0.279*** 0.332*** 0.290*** 
 (127.0) (6.80) (372.9) (102.1) (129.7) (95.23) 
       
Observations 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 
R-squared 0.026 0.083 0.032 0.432 0.442 0.224 
Fixed-Effects None Industry Firm None Industry Firm 
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
 
This table presents our results from the estimation of equation (5). The dependent variable is Kahn and Watts (2009) C–SCORE. Our key independent variables of interest are: (1) 
PRE-ELECTION which is an indicator variable equal to one for all days in the year (360 days) prior to an election date; and (2) PRE x MARGIN which is the interaction term 
between PRE-ELECTION and the normalize margin for victory. POST-ELECTION is an indicator variable equal one for all days in the year (360 days) following an election. 
OPPWIN is an indicator variable equal one if the election results in the opposition party winning office. Control variables are from Table 2 but not reported. Robust t-statistics are 
(clustered standard errors by firm) in parentheses. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by ***, **, and *. 
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TABLE 6 
Industry-Level Characteristics and Conservatism Cycles 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
PRE-ELECTION 0.0551*** 0.0744*** 0.0522*** 0.0705*** 0.0575*** 0.0749*** 0.0692*** 0.0810*** 0.0491*** 0.0636*** 
 (27.03) (41.71) (25.99) (39.76) (24.47) (36.14) (26.45) (34.60) (16.36) (24.36) 
PRE x MARGIN -0.102*** -0.141*** -0.101*** -0.139*** -0.108*** -0.148*** -0.112*** -0.140*** -0.0794*** -0.111*** 
 (-30.08) (-50.85) (-29.83) (-49.51) (-29.86) (-49.99) (-27.24) (-42.54) (-17.92) (-30.98) 
SENSITIVE 0.0196*** 0.0179***         
 (9.598) (17.57)         
PRE x SENSITIVE 0.0170*** 0.00757***         
 (7.396) (3.717)         
REGULATE   0.0322*** 0.0206***       
   (13.50) (15.96)       
PRE x REGULATE   0.0359*** 0.0255***       
   (14.39) (11.04)       
HIGH-CONTRACT     0.0262*** 0.00643***     
     (14.20) (6.973)     
PRE x HIGH-CONTRACT     0.00867*** 0.00803***     
     (4.273) (4.257)     
HIGH-LABOR       -0.000379 -0.0127***   
       (-0.175) (-11.88)   
PRE x HIGH-LABOR       -0.00899*** -0.00766***   
       (-3.937) (-3.635)   
HIGH-TRADE         -0.000992 0.00121 
         (-0.432) (1.175) 
PRE x HIGH-TRADE         -0.00797*** -0.00639*** 
         (-3.239) (-2.844) 
Constant 0.115*** 0.269*** 0.114*** 0.266*** 0.109*** 0.275*** 0.121*** 0.285*** 0.108*** 0.256*** 
 (111.2) (95.72) (116.5) (91.12) (84.29) (99.49) (73.23) (105.1) (68.04) (89.90) 
Observations 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 130,910 130,910 99,774 99,774 76,879 76,879 
R-squared 0.021 0.429 0.029 0.431 0.025 0.429 0.018 0.420 0.010 0.410 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
This table presents our results from the estimation of equation (5). The dependent variable is Kahn and Watts (2009) C–SCORE. Key variables of interest are: (1) PRE-
ELECTION, an indicator variable equal to one for all days in the year prior to an election date; and (2) PRE x MARGIN, an interaction term between PRE-ELECTION and 
normalize margin for victory; SENSISTIVE equal one if firm belongs to a politically sensitive industry. REGULATE equal one if a firm is in the finance or utilities industry. 
HIGH-CONTRACT equal one if a firm is in an industry that has an above median value for the Boutchkova et al (2012) measure of sensitivity to contract enforcement. HIGH-
LABOR is an indicator equal one if a firm is in an industry that has an above median value for the Boutchkova et al (2012) measure of labor intensity. HIGH-TRADE is an 
indicator equal one if a firm is in an industry that has an above median value for the Boutchkova et al (2012) measure of international trade exposure. Control variables are from 
Table 2 but not reported. Robust t-statistics are (clustered standard errors by firm) in parentheses. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by ***, **, and *. 
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TABLE 7 
Firm-Level Governance, Taxation, and Litigation and Conservatism Cycles 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
PRE-ELECTION 0.0594*** 0.0592*** 0.0447*** 0.0679*** 0.0637*** 0.0323*** 0.0758*** 0.0749*** 0.0464*** 
 (4.407) (4.379) (3.157) (31.31) (29.55) (15.13) (37.02) (36.55) (23.65) 
PRE x MARGIN -0.0607*** -0.0549*** -0.0273 -0.114*** -0.104*** -0.0391*** -0.125*** -0.122*** -0.0507*** 
 (-4.665) (-4.237) (-1.511) (-36.54) (-34.26) (-13.41) (-41.37) (-40.78) (-19.34) 
INDEPENDENT 0.0460*** 0.0478*** 0.00947       
 (11.48) (11.73) (1.190)       
G-INDEX 0.000761*** 0.000735*** -0.000115       
 (2.874) (2.770) (-0.128)       
PRE x INDEPENDENT -0.118*** -0.117*** -0.107***       
 (-6.357) (-6.319) (-5.422)       
PRE x G-INDEX -0.00441*** -0.00445*** -0.00427***       
 (-3.797) (-3.819) (-3.533)       
TAX    -0.0539*** -0.0437*** 0.00130    
    (-23.07) (-17.79) (0.480)    
PRE x TAX    -0.0190*** -0.0186*** -0.000854    
    (-3.547) (-3.496) (-0.157)    
LITIGATION       -0.242** -0.386*** 0.0110 
       (-2.575) (-3.835) (0.115) 
PRE x LITIGATION       -3.397*** -3.413*** -2.857*** 
       (-13.24) (-12.87) (-12.13) 
Constant 0.400*** 0.330*** 0.252*** 0.298*** 0.265*** 0.278*** 0.253*** 0.249 0.286*** 
 (75.65) (47.57) (17.18) (108.0) (98.68) (72.89) (70.99) (0.00118) (84.92) 
          Observations 14,372 14,372 14,372 116,411 116,411 116,411 123,637 123,637 123,637 
R-squared 0.533 0.535 0.238 0.420 0.432 0.166 0.416 0.420 0.217 
Fixed-Effects None Industry Firm None Industry Firm None Industry Firm 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
This table presents our results from the estimation of equation (5). The dependent variable is the Kahn and Watts (2009) C–SCORE. Our key independent variables of interest are: 
(1) PRE-ELECTION which is an indicator variable equal to one for all days in the year (360 days) prior to an election date; and (2) PRE x MARGIN which is the interaction term 
between PRE-ELECTION and the normalize margin for victory. INDEPENDENT is the proportion of independent directors. G-INDEX is the Gompers et al. (2003) index of 
external governance. TAX is equal to total tax expense divided by pre-tax accounting income less special items. LITIGATION is the Shu (2000) measure of the probability of 
litigation. Control variables are from Table 2 but not reported. Robust t-statistics are (clustered standard errors by firm) in parentheses. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent 
are represented by ***, **, and *. 
  
37 
 
 
TABLE 8 
Robustness: Political Connections, Business Cycle and Big 4 Auditor 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PRE - ELECTION 0.0782*** 0.0742*** 0.0501*** 0.0495*** 0.0382*** 0.0730*** 0.0696*** 0.0351*** 
 (44.83) (42.59) (21.52) (21.21) (16.49) (32.93) (31.01) (15.56) 
PRE x MARGIN -0.145*** -0.135*** -0.117*** -0.112*** -0.0560*** -0.111*** -0.107*** -0.0413*** 
 (-52.12) (-48.91) (-35.52) (-33.90) (-16.63) (-36.53) (-35.04) (-14.74) 
CONNECTED -0.0227 -0.0198       
 (-1.561) (-1.274)       
PRE x CONNECTED -0.00698 -0.00801       
 (-0.253) (-0.288)       
GROWTH   -0.678*** -0.612*** 0.218***    
   (-42.87) (-38.53) (16.49)    
INFLATION   -0.679*** -0.580*** 0.842***    
   (-41.92) (-34.76) (52.41)    
PRE x GROWTH   0.00136 -0.0437 -0.363***    
   (0.0298) (-0.961) (-8.241)    
PRE x INFLATION   0.413*** 0.403*** 0.292***    
   (8.715) (8.482) (6.147)    
BIG 4      -0.0304*** -0.0236*** -0.00258 
      (-23.22) (-18.82) (-1.464) 
PRE x BIG 4      -0.0197*** -0.0173*** -0.00388** 
      (-10.52) (-9.194) (-2.003) 
Constant 0.274*** 0.326*** 0.357*** 0.371*** 0.218*** 0.294*** 0.297 0.282*** 
 (98.54) (124.5) (119.6) (108.2) (56.24) (94.03) (0.00243) (78.72) 
         Observations 147,894 147,894 124,111 124,111 124,111 131,403 131,403 131,403 
R-squared 0.426 0.436 0.447 0.455 0.209 0.452 0.460 0.221 
Fixed-Effects None Industry None Industry Firm None Industry Firm 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
This table presents our results from the estimation of equation (5). The dependent variable is the Kahn and Watts (2009) C –SCORE. Our key independent variables of interest are: 
(1) PRE-ELECTION which is an indicator variable equal to one for all days in the year (360 days) prior to an election date; and (2) PRE x MARGIN which is the interaction term 
between PRE-ELECTION and the normalize margin for victory. CONNECTED is an indicator equal to one if the firm is politically connected. GROWTH is the annual growth in 
real gross domestic product. INFLATION is the annual growth in the consumer price index. BIG 4 is an indicator if a firm uses one of the Big-4 auditing firms. Control variables 
are from Table 2 but not reported. Robust t-statistics are (clustered standard errors by firm) in parentheses. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by ***, **, 
and *. 
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TABLE 9 
Robustness: Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Pre-SOX Pre-SOX Pre-SOX Post-SOX Post-SOX Post-SOX Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample 
          
PRE-ELECTION 0.0518*** 0.0493*** 0.0325*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.0577*** 0.0564*** 0.0536*** 0.0378*** 
 (34.66) (32.18) (19.17) (20.36) (20.31) (10.64) (36.64) (34.15) (22.85) 
PRE x MARGIN -0.0870*** -0.0815*** -0.0333*** -0.278*** -0.277*** -0.105*** -0.110*** -0.103*** -0.0520*** 
 (-45.08) (-40.83) (-14.62) (-17.40) (-17.32) (-5.871) (-49.35) (-45.33) (-22.12) 
SOX       0.0711*** 0.0676*** 0.00517*** 
       (71.75) (67.82) (3.454) 
PRE x SOX       0.0101*** 0.0113*** 0.0161*** 
       (5.141) (5.710) (8.013) 
Constant 0.215*** 0.213*** 0.245*** 0.536*** 0.538 0.604*** 0.277*** 0.272*** 0.286*** 
 (130.6) (40.68) (87.53) (90.83) (0.00626) (35.02) (124.7) (112.1) (90.00) 
          
Observations 104,463 104,463 104,463 38,732 38,732 38,732 147,894 147,894 147,894 
R-squared 0.436 0.443 0.220 0.647 0.648 0.264 0.462 0.469 0.216 
Fixed-Effects None Industry Firm None Industry Firm None Industry Firm 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
This table presents our results from the estimation of equation (5). The dependent variable is the Kahn and Watts (2009) C–SCORE. Our key independent variables of interest are: 
(1) PRE-ELECTION which is an indicator variable equal to one for all days in the year (360 days) prior to an election date; and (2) PRE x MARGIN which is the interaction term 
between PRE-ELECTION and the normalize margin for victory. SOX is an indicator equal to one for all years after the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Control variables 
are from Table 2 but not reported. Robust t-statistics are (clustered standard errors by firm) in parentheses. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by ***, **, 
and *. 
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TABLE 10 
Robustness: Alternative Windows 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
90-PRE-ELECTION 0.0130*** 0.0108***   
 (5.300) (4.406)   
90-PRE x MARGIN -0.0639*** -0.0530***   
 (-14.90) (-12.21)   
180-PRE-ELECTION   0.0352*** 0.0337*** 
   (11.69) (11.18) 
180-PRE x MARGIN   -0.0980*** -0.0880*** 
   (-21.19) (-18.83) 
Constant 0.267*** 0.212*** 0.269*** 0.213*** 
 (87.35) (105.4) (88.37) (106.3) 
     
Observations 147,894 147,894 147,894 147,894 
Fixed-Effects None Industry None Industry 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
This table presents our results from the estimation of equation (5). The dependent variable is the Kahn and Watts (2009) C–SCORE. Our key independent variables of interest are: 
(1) 90-PRE-ELECTION which is an indicator variable equal to one all days up to 90 days prior to an election date; (2) 90-PRE x MARGIN which is the interaction term between 
90-PRE-ELECTION and the normalize margin for victory; (3) 180-PRE-ELECTION which is an indicator variable equal to one all days up to 180 days prior to an election date; 
and (4) 180-PRE x MARGIN which is the interaction term between 180-PRE-ELECTION and the normalize margin for victory. Control variables are from Table 2 but not 
reported. Robust t-statistics are (clustered standard errors by firm) in parentheses. Significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent are represented by ***, **, and *. 
